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The Son’s Portion in the Oldest Laws Known.
BY PROFESSOR ALBERT T. CLAY, PH.D., LL.D., YALE UNIVERSITY.
OLD TESTAMENT critics claimed not so many years
ago that it was impossible to conceive of a code
of laws written in Palestine as early as the time of
Moses. It then would scarcely have been thought
reasonable if it had been stated that at a much
earlier time the Babylonians probably possessed
a highly developed code. A little more than
a decade ago a code inscribed upon a large and
irregular diorite stone was discovered in Elam.
It was written prior to 2000 r~.c., and contains
a code of laws by Hammurabi (or Ammurapi) ; ’-,
who, as practically all scholars now agree, is the
Amraphel of Gn 141, a contemporary of Abraham.
Scholars familiar with the history of the times
and the laws which he codified quite properly
assumed that they had been based upon earlier
collections of laws. The phraseology employed,
and the fact that Sumerian laws were quoted in
the contracts of an earlier period, made it clear
that such had been the case ; but t the actual
existence of them could not be proved. Recently
there was secured for the Yale Babylonian Collec-
’tion a tablet which was heavily encrusted from
being buried for four thousand years in earth
impregnated with salts. After the tablet was
cleaned, it proved to belong to a period earlier
than that of Hammurabi, and to contain laws
written in Sumerian, the language of Southern
Babylonia prior to its conquest by the Semites or
Accadians in the time of Hammurabi.
Jahweh is said to have been the source of
Israel’s laws. Hammurabi gives Shamash credit
for his laws. At the close of this document it is
stated that they are ‘ the laws of Nisaba (a
goddess) and Khani (a god).’ The exact signific-
ance of the interesting order, that of goddess
followed by the god, cannot at present be deter-
mined.
The special interest of this tablet in connexion
with the Code of Hammurabi is that it proves to
be a prototype of that Code. While the tablet
and the Code treat the same subject-matter, it
would be impossible to say that the laws of the
Code were dependent on those represented by the
tablet if it were not for one striking and conclusive
instance. The first law on the reverse of the
Sumerian tablet, which unfortunately is the only
side preserved, reads: ’If (a man) push a
daughter of a man, and make let fall the posses-
sion for her interior, he shall pay ten shekels of
silver.’ The second reads : If (a man) strike the
daughter of a man, and make let fall the possession
of her interior, he shall pay one-third of a mine of
silver (twenty shekels).’ These two laws are con-
densed into one, found in the Hammurabi Cod,:,
which reads : ’ If a man strike the daughter oi
a man, and make her let fall that which is of her
interior, he shall pay ten shekels of silver for that
which is of an interior.’ . The penalty, namely, the
payment of ten shekels in the Hammurabi Code,
is taken from the first - mentioned law of the
Sumerian Code, in which the accidental injury is .
referred to ; but the act of striking with the
intention to injure, found in the Hammurabi
Code, is taken from the second section of the
Sumerian, where the act is more severely dealt
with. Although one code is written in Sumerian
and the other in Semitic Babylonian or Accadian,
it seems that the details, as well as the phraseology,
are such that no other conclusion can be reached
than that the former was a prototype of the latter.
The third law covers the loss of a hired ship
through carelessness. The fourth legislates with
reference to a son who renounces his sonship, and
receives his portion. The fifth refers to the
repudiation of a child, doubtless one who was
incorrigible. The sixth covers the case of elope-
ment ; the seventh, the enticing a’way, or the
abduction of a girl, after her parents had refused’
to give her in wedlock. The eighth deals with the
killing of a hired ox by a wild beast; and the
ninth, the loss of a hired animal through neglect.
It is expected that the translation of these laws
will shortly appear in a volume published by Yale
University Press, and to be republished by the
Oxford University Press; one of the laws, however,
follows.
The fourth law reads as follows : ’.If a son say
unto his father and his mother, &dquo;(thou art) not my
father, not my mother &dquo;; from the house, field,
plantation, servants, property, animals he shall go
forth ; and his portion to its full amount he (the
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father) shall give him. His father and his mother
shall say to him, &dquo;not our son.&dquo; From the
neighbourhood of the house he shall go.’ This law
legislates with reference to a son who, desiring to
venture upon a separate career, renounces his
sonship, receives his wages or portion, after which
he leaves his home and is thereafter legally I
separated from his family. In other words, a son i
in good standing with his family who desires to
venture upon a separate career could ask for his
portion or wages. This does not imply unfilial
conduct, for the child may have had a family of ~ I
his own, and wished to provide for his own house.
Such separations were, doubtless, often suggested
by the patriarchal head of the family owing to
limited conditions on the estate, or for many other
reasons. It is quite easy to understand how such
a custom existed among primitive agrarian and
nomadic peoples.
The Code of Hammurabi deals at length with
the laws of inheritance. The ancient Hebrew law
is explicit with reference to the distribution of an
estate after the owner’s death. The relation of
the portion in the present Sumerian laws to the
share allowed by the law of inheritance is not
stated. The amount received may have depended ’ I
upon the years of service, or upon the will of the ’ I
parents. It is reasonable to imagine that the
portion of a son who, together with his own family i
of grown children, had faithfully served the paternal
estate for years would be greater than that of
a son who had just arrived at manhood. The
Hammurabi Code, in providing for an adopted ,
child whom the father desired to repudiate,
requires that ’he gave him of his goods one-
third of the portion of a son, and he shall go. /He shall not give to him of field&dquo; garden, or <
house.’ This implies that the portion which an IIadopted child received upon being sent away /differed from that which he would have received ’
as an inheritance. I~
Several adoption deeds are known, belonging to /
.the same period as the Hammurabi Code, about
2000 B.C., which contain similar provisiona ; to I
, quote from one, If Iltani or Nidnat-Sin say to
Mar-Ishtar, their (adopted) son, &dquo; thou art not our /
son,&dquo; he shall receive his portion as the children
of Iltani and Nidnat-Sin, and go away.’ But these
conditions are provided for only in the case of
parents repudiating adopted children. The newly /discovered Sumerian Code bearing upon the
portion or wage refers to the action taken by the
child ; and there is no distinction made as to
whether he was an adopted or a real child.
I The law under consideration shows that the
) child who renounced his sonship and received his
portion was legally separated by his parents.
, ’1’his legal banishment contained in the words of
the law, ’(thou art) not our son. From the
neighbourhood of the house he shall go,’ was
a provision of the greatest importance. It was
prudential in character, although it was also,
doubtless, a source of relief to many families.
The son who took this step knew that legally he
had no further claim upon the estate. This
provision annulled the law which provided a share
in the estate for the son after the death of the
father. It also protected the parents from any
further demands. If the portion was squandered,
the son could not legally impose upon them. It
was also a wise provision in the interest of the
other children. They were really party to the
division which had been made. This law pro-
tected their interest in the estate which they and
perhaps their own children were helping to build
up. It was a necessary accompaniment to a law
which provided for a son’s patrimony, and also for
his securing his portion during the lifetime of his
father. And although it belongs to the earliest
known laws, in this feature it seems to be an
advance upon our present-day law, for if a parent
during life gives a child what would be his portion,
and does not leave a will, or a contract which
specifies this, the law of inheritance would grant
him another share.
The tenacity of custom among the peoples of
Western Asia, which is known in many instances
to have survived for millenniums, suggests the idea
that this law throws light on the Parable of the
Prodigal Son (Lk I 511). In accomplishing his
purpose, the son in the parable does not make
a request, but rather a demand : Father, give me
the. portion of substance that falleth to me.’ The
Greek word translated ‘portion’ is no more
definite than it is in the codes and deeds referred
to above. And he divided unto them the
living’ ; after which it is said of the son that he
’gathered all together, and took his journey into
a far country.’ And in his dire extremity, after he
had squandered his portion, knowing that he was
legally dead as a son, he decided that his lot ;
would be better if he were one of his father’s hired :
 at CORNELL UNIV on July 14, 2015ext.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
42
servants. He knew that he had no right to ask
his father for more than this. Upon his return,
his brother, the sole beneficiary, who is generally i
unjustly condemned, who, as the parable shows,
had been most economical in his efforts to build
up the estate, naturally showed anxiety as to what
his father intended to do. Whereupon his father
reminded him that all that he had was his, but at ¡
the same time he said that it was meet to rejoice ~ I
over the return of his brother, who though legally
dead was still his own son. This legal aspect of
the parable does not seem to have been even
surmised by the commentators. It heightens the
contrast between the father, who, on the one hand,
complied with what the law permitted the son to
demand ; and on the other hand, the forgiving
father, who rejoiced over his return, not as a legal
heir, but as a son.
Contributions and Comments.
C6c &dquo;’Woman f~af was a 4inner.
THAT the judgment of the ages must be reversed
with regard to the identification of Mary Magdalen
with the woman that was ‘a sinner’ is true enough ;
that it must be reversed with regard to the view
that the ’ sinner’ was a woman of notoriously bad /
character is not so certain. This view seems still
to hold the field. That a/xapTWlk6-; may have that
meaning has been shown by Wetstein, to whom
readers of my volume on St. Luke are referred.
The division of the Jewish nation into the two
classes of Ot 8iKuioi and ot a~-capTw~~oi no doubt
existed in our Lord’s time, and was emphasized by
those who considered themselves to be 8t’Katot.
But it is not adequate for the explanation of Lk &dquo;
736.5°. If c‘s~,i,uprm.Bus had occurred only in the I
thought attributed to Simon the Pharisee (v.3o), it )
might have been probable that the term meant I
merely one of those who were regarded by the ¡ 
I
more rigorous Jews as ‘sinners’ and ‘accursed.’
But Luke uses it as his own estimate of her; and I
it is a little improbable that, in such a matter, he
would have accepted the Pharisaic point of view.
There is a stronger objection-the passionately
penitential and adoringly affectionate behaviour of
the woman. Would this have been exhibited if
she was merely leaving a careless, but quite
common mode of life, and was grateful to Christ
for not treating her as the Pharisees did?
And there is a still stronger objection. In the
woman’s presence, and publicly before the assem-
bled guests, our Lord speaks of this woman’s sins,
her iiiaiii, sins.’ They were notorious, and there
was no unkindness in thus alluding to them. But
would He have used such words if she had been
merely one of the hundreds, or perhaps thousands,
in that city who paid little attention to the require-
ments of the Law ?
I make many mistakes, but I am unable to admit
that in this particular I have made a mistake
through ignorance. If I am in error, I err in good
company. I turn to Hastings’ D.B. iii. pp. 280 f.,
to an article by a scholar of the first rank, J. B.
Mayor. He speaks of her as ‘ the sinful woman ’
and twice as ’a notorious sinner.’ I turn to
Hastings’ 17. C. G. ii. p. 640. There we are told
that ‘in Mk 8~ the word (,!/.LaprwX6s) is associated
with poixaXi< ; so also in the story of the sinful
woman (Lk 737).’ Dr. Bruce in Ea.~ositor’s Greek
Testament says that this woman is represented ’as
a notorious character; how sinning indicated by
expressive silence ; a harlot. In what city ?
Various conjectures. Why not Capernaum?’
Dr. Salmon (Human Element in the Gospels, p.
482) takes the same view. So also S. J. Andrew
(Life o-f our Lord, p. 283), Burton and Matthews
(Constriictive Studies in the Life of Clzor’st, p. I 13),
Edersheim (Life and Times, i. p. 564). In the
latest edition of the Engvrfiyidi<i b’nitcznrzic‘z, i9m,
wii. p. 814, she is ’the unnamed fallen woman.’
One may add Alford, Cook (Speczker), F. W.
Farrar, Plumptre, Sadler, VVordsworth. Nor is
this view confined to English and American
scholars or to orthodox theologians. We find it
in Burger (Herzog and Plitt), Godet. Hahn, Hase,
Holtzmann, Keim, Meyer, De Wette. Strauss
suspects confusion with the woman taken in
adultery. And some of these writers hold that
this woman was not only a notorious sinner and
~~~obablo of unchaste life, but that no other hypo-
thesis than that of habitual unchastity is adequate.
 at CORNELL UNIV on July 14, 2015ext.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
